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WHO’S DRIVING THAT CAR?: AN 
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AND 
POTENTIAL LIABILITY FRAMEWORKS 
FOR DRIVERLESS CARS 
Abstract: Driverless, or autonomous, cars are being tested on public road-
ways across the United States. For example, California implemented a new 
regulation in 2018 that allows manufacturers to test driverless cars without a 
person inside the vehicle, so long as the manufacturers adhere to numerous 
requirements. The emergence of these vehicles raises questions about accident 
liability and the reach of state regulation regarding driverless cars. To address 
these questions, it is beneficial to look at the liability framework for another 
artificial intelligence system, such as surgical robots. This Note will explore 
possible frameworks of liability before arguing in support of further regula-
tion of driverless cars and hypothesize that the liability for driverless car acci-
dents will likely shift from the driver to the manufacturer. 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 18, 2018, in Tempe, Arizona, Elaine Herzberg was walking 
her bicycle across Mill Avenue where it intersects with Curry Road.1 Fur-
ther down the street, a vehicle was traveling autonomously at about forty 
miles per hour in a forty-five miles per hour zone.2 The vehicle struck and 
killed Ms. Herzberg, marking the first known pedestrian death caused by 
self-driving technology, despite the presence of a human safety driver at the 
wheel of the autonomous vehicle.3 Tempe police released a video of the 
safety driver distracted and without her hands hovering above the wheel as 
many safety drivers are instructed to do.4 The police, however, stated that 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian in 
Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-
driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html [https://perma.cc/2R7M-BE2J] (discussing an accident where 
a woman was killed by an autonomous car in Arizona, where there is limited regulation of auton-
omous vehicles); Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, 
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/tech-
nology/uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/8LAN-QH5K] [hereinafter Wakabayashi, Self-
Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian] (describing an accident where an autonomous vehicle, with a test 
driver in the front seat, hit a pedestrian, at the fault of the vehicle). 
 2 Griggs & Wakabayashi, supra note 1. 
 3 Griggs & Wakabayashi, supra note 1; Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestri-
an, supra note 1.  
 4 See Griggs & Wakabayashi, supra note 1 (discussing a driverless car accident where pedes-
trian was struck and killed by driverless car). 
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the driver was not in the wrong, and that the car itself was to blame for this 
accident.5 This accident brought safety concerns regarding driverless cars 
into fruition and reminded the public that driverless cars remain an experi-
mental venture.6 
Prior to this tragic accident, driverless cars had a relatively positive 
track record, despite a few accidents that were deemed the fault of humans.7 
For example, in November 2017, Las Vegas put a driverless shuttle vehicle 
on the road after a successful controlled trial.8 Despite the vehicle’s success 
during the testing stages, the shuttle crashed within hours of going on the 
road.9 After the accident and subsequent investigation, the police indicated 
that the person, who was driving the semi-automatic truck that crashed into 
the shuttle, was at fault.10 The prospect of widespread driverless cars has 
garnered promises of increased efficiency and safety, in addition to de-
creased traffic.11 These positives, however, are coupled with public con-
cerns of ethical and safety issues, particularly in light of the Tempe acci-
dent.12 
Even prior to the accident in Tempe, there was widespread concern 
about giving driverless cars the power to make life-altering decisions when 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. 
 6 See Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian, supra note 1 (discussing how 
technology companies will have to prove to the public that autonomous vehicle technology is 
safe). 
 7 See Griggs & Wakabayashi, supra note 1 (explaining this was the first known pedestrian 
death associated with autonomous vehicles); Hayley Tsukayama, A Driverless Bus Got into a 
Crash During Its First Day on the Job, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/innovations/wp/2017/11/09/a-driverless-bus-got-into-a-crash-on-its-first-day/?utm_
term=.68e5ade87c9f [https://perma.cc/KQ9D-RU6W] (providing details of an accident where a 
driverless shuttle in Las Vegas got into a crash, not at the fault of the vehicle, within hours of 
being on the road). 
 8 Tsukayama, supra note 7; see Todd Spangler, Self-driving Cars Programmed to Decide 
Who Dies During a Crash, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/cars/2017/11/23/self-driving-cars-programmed-decide-who-dies-crash/891493001/ 
[https://perma.cc/V257-C5WZ] (discussing how autonomous vehicles’ programming must make 
split second decisions regarding who will be injured in the event of a crash). 
 9 Tsukayama, supra note 7. 
 10 See Regina Garcia Cano, Las Vegas Launches Driverless Shuttle Bus. It Gets in a Crash 
Less Than Two Hours Later, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 9, 2017), http://nationalpost.com/news/
world/self-operating-shuttle-bus-crashes-after-las-vegas-launch [https://perma.cc/4BXT-RR9A] 
(reporting on an accident that occurred when a driverless shuttle in Las Vegas got into an accident 
after only hours of being on the road for the first time); Tsukayama, supra note 7 (explaining that 
a spokesperson for the autonomous car’s manufacturer stated that the system functioned the way it 
was intended to). 
 11 Cadie Thompson, The 3 Biggest Ways Self-Driving Cars Will Improve Our Lives, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 10, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/advantages-of-driverless-cars-2016-6 
[https://perma.cc/F92E-3BKJ] (describing several benefits to widespread use of driverless cars). 
 12 See Spangler, supra note 8 (expressing concern about ethical dilemmas and regulatory 
issues that often arise with talk of driverless cars); Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills 
Pedestrian, supra note 1 (noting safety concerns with autonomous technology). 
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faced with the prospect of a crash.13 Some feel uncomfortable with a com-
puter program making a split-second decision that could choose between 
harming its passenger or the surrounding cars.14 In order to combat this di-
lemma or other malfunctions, California law used to require a person to be 
in the driver’s seat of a driverless vehicle just in case they needed to take 
over.15 But, in February 2018, just prior to the Tempe accident, the Califor-
nia legislature joined with other states and passed a law that no longer re-
quires people to be in a driverless car during road tests.16 
This change in regulation is significant because it eliminates the poten-
tial for people to mitigate in an instance where the driverless car malfunc-
tions or the car faces a “trolley problem” scenario.17 The trolley problem is 
a hypothetical, ethical dilemma that involves making a decision where both 
options will lead to third party harm.18 Alternatively, removing people from 
driverless cars also eliminates the potential for people to make a hazardous 
situation worse by interfering with the autonomous vehicle’s program-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Spangler, supra note 8. 
 14 Id.; see Mark Remy, Variations of the Trolley Problem, NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/humor/daily-shouts/variations-of-the-trolley-problem 
[https://perma.cc/95N4-KY3U] (discussing the “trolley problem” and other ethical and moral 
dilemmas). The ethical dilemma discussed above is commonly compared to “The Trolley Prob-
lem.” Spangler, supra note 8. The Trolley Problem poses a situation where a person is walking 
along train tracks and sees a runaway trolley. Remy, supra. The trolley is headed for five people; 
however, they see a lever that would change the direction of the trolley so that it is only in the 
direction of one person. Id. This forces the person to choose between two bad outcomes. Id. 
 15 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.34 (amended 2018); see Johana Bhuiyan, Driverless Cars 
Can Operate in California as Early as April, RECODE (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.recode.net/
2018/2/26/17053898/driverless-cars-self-driving-california-dmv-remote-operated-autonomous-
testing [https://perma.cc/NP7C-MX4T] (discussing a change in a California Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) regulation allowing for public testing of autonomous vehicles without people in 
the car); Aarian Marshall, Fully Self-Driving Cars Are Really Truly Coming to California, WIRED 
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/california-self-driving-car-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
R529-WBJZ] (reporting on California’s new 2018 regulation that details a process where autono-
mous vehicles can be tested without a person in the car). 
 16 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.38 (2018); see Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (discussing how the 
new California law requires that there be a remote operator of the vehicle who is ready to takeover 
the vehicle with a remote control as needed throughout the testing process); Marshall, supra note 
15 (explaining how Arizona has no regulatory framework regarding self-driving cars while Cali-
fornia has an entire regulatory system). Arizona does not have any set regulations regarding driv-
erless cars and Arizona Governor Doug Ducey wants state agencies to take “any necessary steps” 
in support of driverless car testing. Marshall, supra note 15.  
 17 See Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (using a chart to explain the decreased amount of human inter-
vention on driverless car testing); Remy supra note 14 (explaining the trolley problem and how it 
creates an ethical dilemma); Spangler, supra note 8 (explaining how driverless cars can yield a no-
win situation that arises from the vehicle being programmed in advance and with the inability to 
make ethical snap-decisions). 
 18 See Remy, supra note 14 (describing the trolley problem as a moral dilemma); supra note 
14 and accompanying text. 
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ming.19 The decision to remove drivers from the wheel differentiates auton-
omous vehicles from other existing forms of artificial intelligence, such as 
surgical robots, which by design, require surgeons to operate the machinery 
and mitigate any damages caused by the robot.20 Surgical robots have been 
in use for over twenty years, and while the case law is limited, they serve as 
an analogous example of litigation regarding artificial intelligence.21 Surgi-
cal robots are not completely autonomous and require the control of sur-
geons, who are additionally available to perform regular surgery on the pa-
tient if the robot malfunctions.22 An analysis and comparison of surgical 
robots and driverless cars will help determine whether regulating driverless 
cars brings this technology in the right direction regarding mitigation and 
liability litigation concerns.23 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (allowing driverless cars to operate without a person 
inside the vehicle); Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (charting change in human intervention in driverless 
cars); Andrew J. Hawkins, California Green Lights Fully Driverless Cars for Testing on Public 
Roads, THE VERGE (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/26/17054000/self-driving-
car-california-dmv-regulations [https://perma.cc/4H5Z-MX8L] (discussing the implications of 
California’s fully autonomous car regulation and how it will positively impact driverless car com-
panies). 
 20 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.38 (allowing driverless cars to be tested without a per-
son behind the wheel). Compare Hawkins, supra note 19 (explaining how California’s new 2018 
regulation no longer requires a person to be inside the car while it is being tested), with How Does 
da Vinci Robotic Surgery Work?, UNITY POINT HEALTH, https://www.unitypoint.org/cedarrapids/
services-how-does-it-work.aspx [hereinafter da Vinci Robotic Surgery] (explaining how the da 
Vinci robotic system works when performing a surgery). 
 21 See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 Fed. App’x 925, 926 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
burden of proof required for a plaintiff to prove malfunction versus doctor negligence); Brown v. 
Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining the necessity of expert testimony in 
surgical robot cases); Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 P.3d 517, 526–28 (Wash. 2017) (dis-
cussing strict liability and the standards for unavoidably unsafe products); Eliza Strickland Auton-
omous Robot Surgeon Bests Humans in World First, SPECTRUM (May 4, 2016), https://spectrum.
ieee.org/the-human-os/robotics/medical-robots/autonomous-robot-surgeon-bests-human-surgeons-
in-world-first [https://perma.cc/94RX-T6ZU] (discussing how surgical robots might have a similar 
trajectory to autonomous vehicles in that they start with the surgeon retaining a lot of control, and 
eventually become completely autonomous); see also da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20 
(explaining how the da Vinci robotic system works when performing a surgery). The da Vinci is a 
surgical robot model that provides surgeons with a very magnified view of their patient and makes 
it possible for surgeons to operate in extremely small incisions. da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra 
note 20. This makes recovery for patients more comfortable as their incisions are not as large. Id. 
 22 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (discussing how the surgeon converted a surgical robot 
surgery to a laparoscopic one when the robot malfunctioned); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (describing 
how the surgeon in this case turned the surgical robot procedure into a traditional one when the 
robot malfunctioned); Strickland, supra note 21 (explaining how surgical robots currently embody 
the general concept of “supervised autonomy” by assisting surgeons rather than performing full 
operations for them). 
 23 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (discussing the burden of proof required for a plaintiff 
to prove malfunction versus doctor negligence); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 778 (explaining the neces-
sity of expert testimony in surgical robot cases); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 526–28 (discussing strict 
liability and the standards for unavoidably unsafe products); da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 
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This Note will explore the viability and implications of truly autono-
mous cars, where people are not required to be inside, by comparing driver-
less cars with surgical robots.24 Part I of this Note will discuss the back-
ground of autonomous vehicles, and how they are regulated in the United 
States, in addition to surgical robots and their liability framework.25 Part II 
will conduct a comparison between surgical robots and driverless cars, fo-
cusing in particular on their levels of autonomy, mitigation implications, 
safety classifications, and expertise of the operators.26 Part III will argue 
that providing a regulatory framework for driverless cars, while it has some 
drawbacks, is beneficial to society as a whole and is a step towards people’s 
full enjoyment of the potential of driverless cars.27 It will additionally argue 
that adopting strong driverless car regulations, like California’s, will create 
a more clear liability litigation framework for driverless cars.28 
I. THE MECHANICS: AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT HISTORY,  
REGULATIONS, AND LIABILITY FRAMEWORKS 
As engineers get closer to finalizing driverless car models for the gen-
eral public’s use, questions about how these cars will change the current 
system of the roads loom.29 Since driverless cars have not been publicly 
implemented, there is no relevant legal doctrine or case law that provides 
insight into the liability framework of autonomous vehicles.30 It is therefore 
                                                                                                                           
20 (describing a leading surgical robot system); Ashely Halsey III, When Driverless Cars Crash, 
Who Gets the Blame and Pays the Damages?, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/local/trafficandcommuting/when-driverless-cars-crash-who-gets-the-blame-and-pays-
the-damages/2017/02/25/3909d946-f97a-11e6-9845-576c69081518_story.html?utm_term=.8d11
0073deb8 [https://perma.cc/EU5S-YC3U] (discussing the liability concerns regarding driverless 
car accidents and the numerous potential liable parties); Marshall, supra note 15 (explaining Cali-
fornia’s new 2018 regulation allowing driverless cars to be tested on public roads without a person 
inside); Spangler, supra note 8 (describing how autonomous vehicles must make fast decisions on 
the road that can have serious consequences on passengers and pedestrians); Clive Thompson, 
Cities Without Signs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/
08/magazine/tech-design-autonomous-future-cars-100-percent-augmented-reality-policing.html 
[https://perma.cc/4HUC-SV4K] (describing what the roads might look like if all cars were auton-
omous). 
 24 See infra notes 29–223 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 29–123 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 124–176 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 177–206 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 207–223 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Spangler, supra note 8 (discussing ethical concerns about self-driving cars being pro-
grammed in advance to avoid certain things and not others); Thompson, supra note 23 (explaining 
how driverless cars might reduce accidents, improve traffic, and lead to more efficient fuel use). 
 30 See Halsey, supra note 23 (discussing who might be liable when a driverless car gets into 
an accident, whether it be the car owner, manufacturer, or software developer); Yuki Noguchi, 
Self-Driving Cars Raise Questions About Who Carries Insurance, NPR (Apr. 3, 2017), https://
www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522222975/self-driving-cars-raise-questions-
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important to look at the legal doctrine applicable to other artificial intelli-
gence to provide clarity for how the U.S. courts may decide who is liable 
when autonomous vehicles are involved.31 This Part will discuss the history 
and current overview of autonomous cars, outline the legal doctrine of sur-
gical robots, and briefly summarize liability case law for cars in general.32 
A. A Brief History of Autonomous Technology 
Robert Whitehead created the self-propelled torpedo in the 1860s, 
which was one of the first recorded uses of semi-autonomous technology.33 
Over time, semi-autonomous technology has evolved and, today, car com-
panies have now gone so far as to create cars that park and brake them-
selves.34 This technology, known as “driver-assist,” utilizes sensors and 
                                                                                                                           
about-who-carries-insurance [https://perma.cc/Q3KN-MVMC] (contemplating liability concerns 
of autonomous vehicles from an insurance perspective and which parties will hold the insurance 
when driverless cars become available to the public). 
 31 See Halsey, supra note 23 (explaining the lack of clarity regarding driverless car liability); 
Noguchi, supra note 30 (explaining how driverless car accidents that have occurred in the testing 
phase have left questions unanswered about the insurance scheme for autonomous vehicles); 
Strickland, supra note 21 (explaining how surgical robots and driverless cars used to be similarly 
autonomous but driverless cars are now more autonomous than surgical robots). 
 32 See infra notes 29–123 and accompanying text. 
 33 E.W. Jolie, A Brief History of U.S. Navy Torpedo Development, S.F. MAR. NAT’L PARK 
ASS’N (Sept. 15, 1978), https://maritime.org/doc/jolie/part1.htm#page003 [https://perma.cc/HL8K-
HSEU]; Marc Weber, Where to? A History of Autonomous Vehicles, COMPUT. HISTORY MUSEUM 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.computerhistory.org/atchm/where-to-a-history-of-autonomous-vehicles/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CDM-SCN9] (describing the history of autonomous vehicles including various 
propellers, airplanes, and automobile technology that has led to the autonomous automobile). 
Torpedoes are weapons used in combat that are sent to shoot down enemy targets. See Jolie, su-
pra. The “self-propelled torpedo” was primarily used for defending naval ports and attacking by 
surprise. Id. This invention paved the way for boats and other motorized vehicles to develop au-
tomated steering. Id. In 1914, Lawrence Sperry was known to create the first successful autopilot 
in an airplane. William Scheck, Lawrence Sperry: Genius on Autopilot, HISTORYNET (Nov. 
2014), http://www.historynet.com/lawrence-sperry-autopilot-inventor-and-aviation-innovator.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X9WQ-URPV]. Autopilot on airplanes today controls various aspects of flights, 
such as heading, altitude, course, speed, and more, without the pilot manually controlling each of 
these components. Melody Kramer, Q&A With a Pilot: Just How Does Autopilot Work?, NAT. 
GEO. (July 18, 2013), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/130709-planes-autopilot-
ask-a-pilot-patrick-smith-flying-asiana/ [https://perma.cc/87QU-B5RE]. These types of systems, 
however, still require the pilot to look over the controls and perform other functions involved with 
flying a plane. Id. Similar autopilot systems called “cruise control,” where the driver does not have 
to press the gas pedal in order to control the speed of the car, have since been implemented for 
automobiles, however the driver must manually steer and brake the vehicle. Ishan Daftardar, How 
Does the Cruise Control System in Cars Work?, SCIENCE ABC (June 24, 2016), https://www.
scienceabc.com/innovation/what-is-cruise-control-system-cars-work.html [https://perma.cc/5TGL-
PFJW]. 
 34 Weber, supra note 33; see Doug Newcomb & Alex Colon, The Best Driver-Assist Cars of 
2018, P.C. MAG. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2485278,00.asp [https://
perma.cc/6VRX-KD79] (evaluating cars with driver assist features and explaining those features, 
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cameras on the car to detect where other cars are on the road, and can even 
select good parallel parking spots.35 While these conveniences are helpful to 
drivers, the driver still maintains control over the vehicle and is able to in-
tervene while the car performs these functions.36 
Additionally, throughout history, many engineers have not only tried to 
create semi-autonomous vehicles, but have also tried to create fully auton-
omous vehicles that could almost drive themselves.37 A few versions of 
these “driverless cars” were created in the early 20th century, however, 
these models relied on devices such as magnets or tracks to control the ve-
hicles, as opposed to the fully autonomous cars that are being worked on 
today.38 The first idea for a vehicle that could travel without direct human 
supervision came in 1925, and was put to test by Houdina Radio Control.39 
Houdina Radio Control controlled their “driverless car” by using radio 
technology in a regular car behind the “driverless car” model.40 Next, in the 
1950s, rather than using radios, Radio Corporation of America (“RCA”) used 
electrical impulses to drive vehicles remotely.41 RCA vehicles operated on 
“smart roads,” which would give the vehicle above it electronic directions for 
steering, acceleration, and braking.42 These roads were created in Princeton, 
New Jersey and Lincoln, Nebraska with the hope that roads across the coun-
                                                                                                                           
including blind spot assistance, lane departure prevention, forward collision prevention, active 
cruise control, and automated parking). 
 35 Newcomb & Colon, supra note 34.  
 36 See Aaron Turpen, How Self-Parking Car Technology Works: The First Step to Autonomous 
Vehicles, NEW ATLAS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://newatlas.com/how-self-parking-works/46684/ [https://
perma.cc/2A98-UDTD] (describing in detail how self-parking car technology works utilizing sensors 
and navigational technology). 
 37 See John Patrick Pullen, You Asked: How Do Driverless Cars Work?, TIME (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://time.com/3719270/you-asked-how-do-driverless-cars-work/ [https://perma.cc/8JZF-YL39] 
(evaluating the current status of driverless cars, what their future looks like, and the types of 
equipment that will help driverless cars be the most successful); Self-Driving Cars Explained, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/how-
self-driving-cars-work#.Wk1N9lQ-eu4 [https://perma.cc/3TXR-CQK3] (explaining various tech-
nical features of driverless cars, including the general software design, radar and satellite technol-
ogy, and more). 
 38 The Road to Driverless Cars: 1925–2025, ENG’G (July 15, 2016), https://www.engineering.
com/esignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/12665/The-Road-to-Driverless-Cars-1925–2025.
aspx [https://perma.cc/D28T-9N5E] [hereinafter Road to Driverless Cars] (explaining the history 
of autonomous vehicles that has led up to the present prospect of driverless cars). 
 39 ‘Phantom Auto’ Will Tour City, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL (Dec. 8, 1926), https://news.google.
com/newspapers?id=unBQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=QQ8EAAAAIBAJ&pg=7304,3766749 [https://perma.
cc/SJ8H-GHQW] (reporting on the phantom auto car that will run without a person inside the car 
and will be controlled externally); Road to Driverless Cars, supra note 38.  
 40 Road to Driverless Cars, supra note 38. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. (discussing how electrical impulses could power a car that had sensors to detect the 
impulses in the road). 
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try could implement this system.43 Unfortunately, this RCA system never 
took off, and did not become more widespread.44 
Modern self-driving car models are primarily guided by navigation 
systems and are a product of advancements in radar and computer soft-
ware.45 The first essential components are the navigation systems, which 
work like a map program, with the car deciding the best route while consid-
ering traffic data and other factors.46 Additionally, these cars have radar, 
cameras, and lasers that help detect other vehicles, additional obstacles, and 
any other changes that might occur on the car’s route.47 For example, one of 
the most notable features of Google’s self-driving car is a rotating light and 
radar sensor on top of the vehicle that detects potential hazards.48 Driverless 
cars will function best when all other cars on the road utilize the same tech-
nology, allowing the cars to “talk” to each other.49 When driverless cars are 
the only cars on the road, they can operate and “think” at a faster level than 
people, presumably making them more efficient and safe.50 Finally, these 
vehicles are equipped with a computer program that turns the information 
gathered from these systems into actions such as steering, accelerating, or 
braking.51 In sum, driverless cars are a function of a combination of many 
parts working together.52 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Victoria Woollaston, How Do Google’s Driverless Cars Work?, ALPHR (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://www.alphr.com/cars/7038/how-do-googles-driverless-cars-work [https://perma.cc/B5UV-
E2ZQ] (explaining how Google’s 2016 driverless car model works). 
 46 See id (describing how global positioning systems (GPS) guide Google’s driverless car). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.; see Skye Gould & Danielle Muoio, Here’s How Waymo’s Brand New Self-Driving 
Cars See the World, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-does-
googles-waymo-self-driving-car-work-graphic-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/B52C-5F64] (describing 
the technology behind Waymo’s driverless cars, including their satellite and radar technology). 
This satellite operates by shooting lasers so that the car can detect what’s around it. Gould & 
Muoio, supra. 
 49 Pullen, supra note 37; see Gould & Muoio, supra note 48 (detailing Waymo’s driverless 
car initiative); Woollaston, supra note 45 (describing Google’s 2016 driverless car model). The 
majority of accidents that have occurred with driverless cars that are currently on the road have 
been ruled the fault of the human driver as opposed to the driverless car. Alex Davies, Google’s 
Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/
02/googles-self-driving-car-may-caused-first-crash/ [https://perma.cc/G9Y3-AEFA] (reporting 
that despite a record of accidents that were at fault of others, Google’s driverless car was the cause 
of its first crash). 
 50 See Davies, supra note 49 (explaining how the first seventeen crashes of Google’s driver-
less cars were due to human error). 
 51 Gould & Muoio, supra note 48; Woollaston, supra note 45. 
 52 See Gould & Muoio, supra note 48 (explaining how different companies work together to 
create each component of Waymo’s driverless car); Woollaston, supra note 45 (describing differ-
ent components of driverless cars). 
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Currently, some self-driving cars have already been introduced for test-
ing purposes, but remain unavailable for purchase to the public.53 This, 
however, has not prevented numerous accidents involving driverless cars 
from occurring.54 In February 2016, a Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) report in California indicated that one of Google’s driverless cars 
was the cause of another autonomous crash, due to a last minute lane 
change.55 Despite this accident, Google has continued to study, test and cre-
ate new models of driverless cars.56 Their results conclude that, while the 
majority of the accidents its cars were involved in were due to human error, 
there have been incidents where driverless cars have been at fault.57 Driver-
less car accidents have also occurred in Pittsburgh, a city where testing of 
autonomous vehicles is permitted.58 One accident involved a model created 
by Argo, a company backed by Ford, and another involved an autonomous 
Uber.59 While engineers do their best to improve the technology of self-
driving cars, it still has not been perfected, as evidenced by the Tempe, Ari-
zona accident.60 The results of Google’s study also help predict that self-
driving cars will be the most effective when they are the only vehicles on 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (requiring manufacturers to abide by regulations to test 
driverless vehicles); Tsukayama, supra note 7 (citing numerous crashes involving driverless cars 
that were being tested by manufacturers). 
 54 See Davies, supra note 49 (describing a recent crash involving one of Google’s autono-
mous vehicles); Andrew J. Hawkins, Ford-Backed Self-Driving Car Involved in an Accident That 
Sent Two People to the Hospital, THE VERGE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
1/10/16875066/argo-ai-self-driving-car-crash-pittsburgh-ford [https://perma.cc/4RA5-9Q96] (ex-
plaining an accident that occurred in Pittsburgh involving a driverless car). 
 55 Davies, supra note 49. 
 56 See Gould & Muoio, supra note 48 (explaining how Google is continuing to release new 
autonomous vehicles into the markets in California and Arizona); see also Davies, supra note 49 
(explaining Google’s dilemma of wanting to perfect the vehicles while also quickly getting them 
on the market). 
 57 See Tsukayama, supra note 7 (explaining how human intervention behind the wheel of 
some driverless cars has caused accidents, rather than the driverless car themselves). 
 58 Aaron Aupperlee, Uber’s Fleet of Self-Driving Cars in Pittsburgh Back on Road After 
South Side Crash, TRIBUTE LIVE (Sept. 18, 2017), http://triblive.com/local/allegheny/12748396-
74/ubers-fleet-of-self-driving-cars-grounded-in-pittsburgh-after-crash [https://perma.cc/4EW7-
S9AY] (describing a driverless car crash that occurred in Pittsburgh that was not deemed the fault 
of the driverless vehicle). 
 59 Hawkins, supra note 54. In the Argo model’s accident, a truck driven by a human driver 
was at fault after going through a red light and ramming into it. Id. 
 60 See Davies, supra note 49 (quoting Google’s program director for their driverless car pro-
gram who states that it is a challenge to weigh making the cars as perfect as possible with getting 
them on the market soon to prevent further human error behind the wheel); Griggs & Waka-
bayashi, supra note 1 (reporting that the driverless car was at fault in the Tempe, Arizona acci-
dent); Tsukayama, supra note 7 (explaining how driverless car models have yet to be deemed 
perfect, although there are arguments that they are safer than the cars that are on the road now); 
Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian, supra note 1 (reporting that despite having 
an emergency backup driver, the Uber driverless car hit a pedestrian causing the company to halt 
vehicle testing across the country). 
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the road, which would allow them to communicate with each other without 
human interference.61 But, this creates a liability problem, as the cars them-
selves cannot be sued if their programing makes a wrong decision.62 This 
liability problem, however, is not unique to driverless cars and additionally 
extends to other uses of artificial intelligence to help execute tasks formerly 
performed solely by people.63 
B. How Some States Regulate Driverless Cars 
California serves as a relevant example of a state that has consistently 
regulated its driverless car industry and has an entire regulatory code dedi-
cated to the operation of testing driverless cars.64 In contrast, other states 
such as Arizona, have much less driverless car regulation pertaining to 
manufacturer testing.65 Arizona presently has an executive order in place 
that allows for the testing of driverless cars on public roads and only re-
quires that the car has liability insurance and the person in charge of it has a 
driver’s license.66 California, however, recently shifted its regulation to 
more closely resemble that of states like Arizona by allowing driverless cars 
to operate without a person in the car in enumerated circumstances.67 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Pullen, supra note 37 (discussing how people cannot process data or information as 
quickly as driverless cars can, and how such cars will be able to efficiently “talk” to each other on 
the road); Thompson, supra note 23 (explaining how driverless cars can recognize signals and 
quickly process information). 
 62 See Halsey, supra note 23 (questioning who would be sued if a driverless vehicle crashed); 
Noguchi, supra note 30 (discussing insurance implications of driverless cars and how the cars 
themselves might be able to shed light on who was at fault). 
 63 See Robotic Surgery and the Huge Risk of Legal Liability, MOS MED. REC. REVS. (Mar. 6, 
2017), http://www.mosmedicalrecordreview.com/blog/2017/03/robotic-surgery-and-the-risk-of-
legal-liability.html [https://perma.cc/AU49-D9E8] (discussing how robotic surgery can subject 
hospitals and doctors to increased legal liability); see also Halsey supra note 23 (explaining a 
possible standard by which driverless car liability might be held to); Noguchi, supra note 30 (dis-
cussing insurance concerns with driverless cars). 
 64 See Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (noting that California law requires an employee of a manufac-
turer to have remote access to a driverless vehicle in the case of an emergency); Marshall, supra 
note 16 (detailing the requirements for the new California 2018 regulation). 
 65 Ottavia Zappala, Why Automakers Flock to Arizona to Test Driverless Cars, ARIZ. REP. 
(Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/12/26/why-automakers-flock-
arizona-test-driverless-cars/981840001/ [https://perma.cc/EG98-U7BT] (discussing how the lack 
of regulations in Arizona provide more lenient conditions for companies to test their autonomous 
vehicles). 
 66 Zappala, supra note 65.  
 67 Id.; see Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Scraps Safety Driver Rules for Self-Driving 
Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/technology/driverless-
cars-california-rules.html [https://perma.cc/4ES7-3RG5] [hereinafter Wakabayashi, California 
Scraps Safety Driver Rules] (discussing various details of California’s DMV regulation, which no 
longer requires a person in the driver’s seat to take over in the event of an emergency but requires 
companies to control test vehicles remotely). 
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On February 26, 2018, California adopted a new administrative law 
regarding the regulation of driverless car testing in their state that allows 
autonomous vehicles to be tested without a person inside.68 Additionally, 
the legislature created new regulations regarding both manufacturers and 
employees who are actually testing the vehicles without being inside.69 Cal-
ifornia law lists numerous circumstances where there need not be a driver 
inside the vehicle whatsoever, but generally does require that there be a test 
driver in the car at all times.70 In order for a manufacturer to test their driv-
erless vehicle without a test driver present, they must first submit an appli-
cation for a Manufacturer’s Testing Permit and then meet the other require-
ments for testing driverless cars in the State of California.71 Additionally, 
the new 2018 regulation lays out several specific requirements regarding the 
design and technology behind the driverless car that must also be met in 
order to drive without a test driver.72 The new 2018 regulations also require 
the manufacturer of the driverless car have a “law enforcement interaction 
plan,” which would make it possible for first responders to interact with the 
driverless car to help regulate traffic and in case of an emergency.73 Finally, 
the manufacturer must maintain a training program for its remote operators 
and provide information regarding the program and what it entails.74 Thus 
far, this California law only applies to test drivers as California does not 
allow personal driverless cars yet.75 California additionally kept regulations 
that had been in place prior to the recent change in legislation.76 For exam-
ple, California law sets strict guidelines regarding who can act as an auton-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (explaining the circumstances under which driverless 
cars can be tested in the state of California). 
 69 Id. § 227.04 (describing the necessary steps that manufacturers and their employees must 
take to test their driverless car on public roads). 
 70 See id. § 227.38 (describing the necessary training, qualifications, and standards that manu-
facturers must uphold to test their autonomous vehicles with people inside of the car). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. First, the manufacturer must certify that they have given “written notification” to the 
jurisdiction where they will be operating that includes: (1) the design of the driverless vehicles; (2) 
which public roads the driverless vehicle will be tested on; (3) the first day that testing will take 
place; (4) days and times that the vehicles will be tested on jurisdiction’s roads; (5) quantity and 
type of vehicles being tested; and (6) contact information for the individual tester and manufactur-
er of the driverless vehicle. Id. Additionally, a few technical requirements have been specified so 
other vehicles and remote operators can communicate with the vehicle being tested. Id. 
 73 Id. § 227.38(e). The regulation notes that this plan is not static and should be reviewed and 
changed, as needed, on a regular basis. Id. 
 74 Id. § 227.38(f). The trainings must include instruction on technologically advanced lan-
guage and the “automated driving system,” including emergency protocols. Id. 
 75 See id. § 227.38 (applying regulation to manufacturing companies only). 
 76 See id. (describing the necessary steps that a manufacturer must undergo in order to test a 
driverless vehicle without a person in the car); Wakabayashi, California Scraps Safety Driver 
Rules, supra note 67 (discussing how California DMV regulations have changed to no longer 
require a person in the car during driverless car testing). 
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omous vehicle test driver.77 Additionally, there are numerous checks regard-
ing a potential autonomous vehicle test driver’s driving history.78 
C. Surgical Robots and Their Liability Framework 
Surgical robots have revolutionized medical care for patients by allow-
ing surgeons to be less invasive, work in smaller areas, and be more precise 
than when performing the same surgery by hand.79 Surgical robots assist 
medical surgeons and are used as a tool to make more precise cuts and inci-
sions in the patient.80 As surgical robots have been in existence for more 
than a decade, there has been limited litigation involving mistakes in surger-
ies performed by surgical robots.81 While different from a truly autonomous 
machine, surgeons still hand over some control to the robots and subject 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. §§ 227.02(c), 227.32. An autonomous vehicle test driver must (1) monitor the vehicle; 
(2) be in a position to control it if necessary; (3) work for the manufacturer; (4) obey all traffic 
laws and regulations, unless breaking the law would further promote safety; and (5) familiarize 
him or herself with the vehicle and its technology to ensure safety. Id. § 227.32. 
 78 See id. § 227.34. The potential driver’s vehicle, license number, and other information must 
be submitted to the DMV. Id. Additionally, the driver must receive an Autonomous Vehicle Test-
ing Program Test Vehicle Operator Permit. Id. Moreover, the test driver must have been licensed 
for at least three years, cannot have any more than one “point” on their license, cannot have been 
the “at-fault driver” in a collision that resulted “in injury or death of any person,” cannot have 
been found driving under the influence for ten years prior to their application, and must have 
completed the “autonomous vehicle test driver training program.” Id. 
 79 da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20; see What Is Robotic Surgery?, UCLA HEALTH, 
https://www.uclahealth.org/robotic-surgery/what-is-robotic-surgery [https://perma.cc/V49M-HV3C] 
(discussing how surgical robots allow surgeons to be more precise when performing urological, 
gynecological, cardiothoracic, and more general surgical procedures, and how when working 
properly, surgical robots cause less trauma, less scaring, and promote a faster recovery time); 
What Is Robotic Surgery?, ROBOTIC SURGERY CTR. NYU LANGONE HEALTH, https://med.nyu.
edu/robotic-surgery/physicians/what-robotic-surgery [https://perma.cc/FXH6-P5BA] (explaining 
how robotic surgery works at NYU Langone Hospital). Surgical robots are expensive, averaging 
$1.5 million per machine. Reuters, Rise of the Surgical Robot and What Doctors Want, FORTUNE 
(July 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/28/surgical-robot-development-intuitive-surgical-
medtronic-google/ [https://perma.cc/E7AE-UU2Q]. These robots are becoming increasingly popu-
lar, however, and most top U.S. hospitals utilize this advancement. Id. Additionally, they are pre-
ferred by many doctors who say that they reduce fatigue and give more control when operating. 
Id. 
 80 da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20; Reuters, supra note 79. Robotic surgeries are 
additionally known to offer minimally invasive options to patients. da Vinci Robotic Surgery, 
supra note 21. Patients of robotic surgeries, on average, have spent less time recovering in the 
hospital following robotic surgery. Id. 
 81 See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 Fed. App’x 925, 927 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a 
surgical robot malfunctioned while performing surgery); Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 
P.3d 517, 521 (Wash. 2017) (same); Homa Alemzadeh et al., Adverse Events in Robotic Surgery: 
A Retrospective Study of 14 Years of FDA Data, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4838256/ [https://perma.cc/S27C-LQ3G] (analyzing fourteen years of 
surgeries using surgical robots and finding that 1.4% of the 10,624 surgeries resulted in deaths, 
13.1% resulted in patient injuries, and 75.9% of surgeries resulted in a device malfunction). 
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themselves to the possibility that the robot could make an error during sur-
gery.82 Surgical robots are a good comparison to driverless cars because of 
this relinquished control, the potential for surgeons to mitigate damages, 
and their liability structure.83 
Current case law indicates that liability claims arising from surgical 
robots have included claims against the surgeons, the manufacturers of the 
robot, and the hospitals where the surgeries are performed.84 When a mis-
take is made, it is often difficult to determine which party made the mistake 
or where the liability should fall because of the complexities of the device.85 
Therefore, the case law regarding surgical robots focuses a lot on expert 
testimony, the duty to warn, and negligence by the controlling surgeon.86 
In 2017, in Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Washington decided the manufacturer of a surgical robot model known as 
the da Vinci System was liable for its robot’s surgical mistake.87 A doctor 
with fifteen years of experience performed a robotic prostatectomy on the 
plaintiff, but the plaintiff’s body mass index (BMI) vastly exceeded the rec-
ommended BMI for this type of surgery.88 The surgeon nonetheless contin-
ued the surgery, causing serious complications.89 Because of these compli-
cations, the surgeon converted the procedure to an open surgery and fin-
ished the surgery without the surgical robot.90 After the surgery, however, 
the plaintiff had a poor quality of life due to these complications and even-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (finding a surgical robot malfunctioned while perform-
ing surgery); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (same). See generally Alemzadeh, supra note 81 (conducting 
research regarding the instances where surgical robots caused injury or death and analyzing what 
the overall impact of these surgical robots has been). 
 83 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (describing how surgeon intervened when a robot mal-
functioned during surgery); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (same); Strickland, supra note 21 (discussing 
how surgical robots might have a similar trajectory to autonomous vehicles). 
 84 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (describing a claim against a surgical robot manufac-
turer); Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (describing a claim against a 
hospital and the manufacturer of the surgical robot used by that hospital); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 524 
(explaining, for warning purposes, that the hospital, rather than the doctor, is considered the ro-
bot’s buyer). 
 85 Alemzadeh, supra note 81, at 2. It is sometimes difficult to figure out exactly what went 
wrong during a botched robotic surgery as detailed records are not always kept. Id. at 16. It is 
additionally difficult to distinguish human error from machine error, especially because human 
error is not always reported. Id. 
 86 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (explaining the standards for both expert testimony and 
the duty to warn in surgical robot cases); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 782 (same); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 
521 (discussing the potential negligence of a surgeon who performed surgery on a patient with a 
body mass index over the recommended limit). 
 87 See Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (describing how a surgical robot malfunctioned during a sur-
gery, requiring the doctor to perform an open surgery instead). 
 88 Id. at 520–30. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 521. 
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tually passed away as a result.91 In a complex analysis, the court looked at a 
number of relevant issues including the duty to warn, differing negligence 
standards, superseding causes, and mitigation of damages.92 The court de-
termined that the manufacturer of the da Vinci System did not satisfy their 
duty to warn the hospital by warning the doctor operating the “unavoidably 
unsafe” surgical robot.93 Additionally, the court took a strict liability ap-
proach for the analysis because, although the product was considered “una-
voidably unsafe,” there was a failure to warn the hospital about the prod-
uct.94 Strict liability is normally applied to products liability cases in the 
way that the product was designed or created whereas negligence cases of-
ten occur when referring to the actual use of the product by the user.95 The 
court additionally held that it was proper for the trial court to give jury in-
structions about the surgeon’s superseding negligence and failure to miti-
gate.96 
In 2016, in Brown v. Griffin, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided 
a medical malpractice suit brought by a patient against her surgeon and the 
hospital for a botched surgical robot procedure.97 An important issue dis-
cussed in this case was the need for expert testimony to help the jury deter-
mine who was at fault and what standards to apply.98 The plaintiff attempted 
to argue that an expert witness was not necessary to prove a breach of care 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 520–30. 
 93 See id. at 527. The learned intermediary doctrine is a legal framework that allows manufac-
turers of “unavoidably unsafe” medical products to satisfy their duty to warn patients by warning 
the doctors who will be using the products instead. Id. The manufacturer has an additional duty to 
warn the hospital to whom they sold their medical equipment, which cannot be satisfied by warn-
ing the doctor. Id. at 525. 
 94 Id. at 527. The court defines an unavoidably unsafe product as one where, “in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use.” Id. at 526. The court goes on to state that unavoidably unsafe products should be marketed 
and labeled as such. Id. If these products follow these rules, then they are not subject to a strict 
liability standard in analyzing their use. Id. 
 95 See Patrick H. O’Neill, Jr., Note, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and the Design Defect 
Theory: An Analysis of Applying Comment K to Strict Liability and Negligence Claims, 15 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1989) (explaining how Comment K affects strict liability and 
negligence claims, and providing background on the strict liability legal theory). The policy ra-
tionale behind the strict liability standard is that the manufacturer or creator of a product is in a 
better position to protect the public against this product, and therefore the rule encourages them to 
prevent any potential harm. Id. 
 96 Taylor, 389 P.3d at 529–30. 
 97 Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 778–79. The surgery performed was a total laparoscopic hysterec-
tomy with a left salpingo-oophorectomy and evaluation of the right ovary. Id. at 779. The surgeon 
defendant inspected the pelvis prior to the surgery. Id. During the procedure, however, the plaintiff 
sustained an injury that went unnoticed for days and required multiple surgeries to correct. Id. 
 98 See id. at 781 (discussing whether expert testimony was necessary to explain the compli-
cated issues that arose during the robotic surgery). 
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so long as the surgeon testified in a deposition.99 The court disagreed with 
the plaintiff because a reasonable jury could not infer the standard of care 
required for a surgeon operating the machine100 The court further reasoned 
that the lack of discernable evidence indicating the surgeon’s negligence 
also supported the need for expert testimony.101 
Similarly, six years earlier, in Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, in the 
U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a patient sued the manufacturer of the 
surgical robot, the surgeon, and the hospital for an injury associated with 
robotic surgery.102 The court held that the patient could not establish a claim 
for strict liability or breach of warranty without an expert report or expert 
testimony.103 These cases highlight the importance of expert testimony in 
situations where it is difficult for a lay juror to understand the facts due to 
the complexity of the surgical procedure, the level of required medical ex-
pertise, and the complexity of the robot itself.104 Additionally, the need for 
experts in these cases illustrates the difference in knowledge between sur-
geons and lay people, as the majority of jurors have not attended medical 
school nor do they know how to perform surgery.105 
Both product liability and design defect claims are also common in 
surgical robot litigation.106 In 2011, in O’Brien v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed claims 
involving pancreatectomy complications that were allegedly caused by the 
da Vinci surgical robot’s defective design.107 A design defect claim is a strict 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 782–83. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927. The plaintiff underwent a prostatectomy aided by a da 
Vinci Surgical Robot. Id. at 926. He claimed that during the surgery the system malfunctioned, 
causing the surgical team and the da Vinci representative to make failed attempts to make the 
system operational. Id. The surgeon opted to use laparoscopic equipment for the rest of the sur-
gery instead of the robot as planned. Id. The plaintiff then suffered multiple additional injuries and 
was left to recover in the hospital for days following the procedure. Id. 
 103 Id. at 927. 
 104 See id. (explaining the necessity of expert testimony in surgical robot cases); Brown, 505 
S.W.3d at 782–83 (explaining how surgical robot litigation is complex and would need expert 
testimony for juries to understand). 
 105 See How Do You Become a Surgeon?, TOP MASTER’S IN HEALTHCARE ADMIN., https://
www.topmastersinhealthcare.com/faq/how-do-you-become-a-surgeon/ [https://perma.cc/2RQK-
HV8Y] (explaining the many steps necessary to become a surgeon, which include getting an un-
dergraduate degree, going to medical school, and attending a residency program). See generally 
Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (explaining how expert testimony can help jurors understand the 
complexity of surgical robots); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 782–83 (discussing importance of expert 
testimony). 
 106 See O’Brien v. Intuitive Surgical Inc., No. 10 C 3005, 2011 WL 3040479, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
July 25, 2011) (dismissing a complaint because it failed to state that the manufacturer proximately 
caused the patient’s injuries). 
 107 Id. 
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liability claim and, therefore, the plaintiff was required to prove that the 
manufacturer proximately caused the malfunction that led to the injuries.108 
This required the plaintiff to prove that the machine, rather than the doctor, 
caused the injury.109 Since the plaintiff failed to prove proximate cause, the 
case was dismissed in favor of the manufacturer.110 This case highlights the 
difficulty of proving causation, especially when artificial intelligence and 
human oversight are intertwined.111 
In addition to products liability, the use of surgical robots also raises 
the question of vicarious liability.112 In each of the cases above, the plain-
tiffs brought suit against the doctor, the manufacturer, and the hospitals 
where these surgeries are performed, despite the fact that some doctors re-
tain independent contractor status with the hospital.113 When a doctor is 
classified as an independent contractor, they are not considered an employ-
ee, but the hospital can still be held liable for their negligence.114 In addition 
to the liability concerns that these cases raise, they also highlight the way in 
which surgeons are able to mitigate the damages caused by the surgical ro-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. Proximate causation occurs when a party acts in a way that causes the injury, with no 
intervening cause, and without the action the injury would not have occurred. Proximate Cause, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 109 O’Brien, No. 10 C 3005, 2011 WL 3040479, at *1. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (discussing the need for plaintiffs to show that the 
defendant did in fact cause their injuries). 
 112 See Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Im-
plications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1052, 
1064–65 (2013) (discussing the implications of vicarious liability and how multiple parties can be 
responsible for the injuries that occur during one instance). Vicarious liability is where one indi-
vidual can be held responsible for the acts of another individual through the principle of agency. 
Id. Common vicarious liability situations include employee and employer relationships, such as 
hospitals and doctor relationships. See id. 
 113 See Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ohio 1994) 
(holding that hospitals can be held strictly liable for the negligence of their employed physicians); 
Allain, supra note 112, at 1062 (discussing liability for physicians and patients). An independent 
contractor relationship generally differs from an employer and employee relationship because, 
typically, a person or institution who hires an independent contractor is shielded from being held 
vicariously liable. See Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 48 (explaining that, because employers of independent 
contractors do not generally exhibit any control over the contractor, liability typically does not 
follow). There are certain instances, however, where hospitals who hire doctors as independent 
contractors can still be held liable for the actions of physicians when “(1) the hospital made repre-
sentations leading the plaintiff to believe that the negligent physician was operating as an agent 
under the hospital’s authority, and (2) the plaintiff was thereby induced to rely upon this ostensible 
agency relationship.” Id. (quoting Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ohio 1990)). 
 114 See Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 48 (stating that there are instances where a hospital can be held 
liable for the actions of a doctor even when they maintain independent contractor status (quoting 
Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1040). 
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bots.115 Putting aside concerns with liability, without the surgeons oversee-
ing the surgery and having the ability to perform open surgery in the event 
of a malfunction, the people undergoing surgery could be put at risk.116 
This analysis of surgical robots is helpful because it outlines the poten-
tial liability framework that could apply to driverless cars.117 Even so, it is 
also important to briefly look at how liability is currently determined for 
normal car accidents.118 In normal accidents, it is much easier to determine 
if the cause of the accident is either the car or one of the people involved.119 
Further, it is somewhat straightforward in these accidents to determine 
whether or not the drivers exercised reasonable care during the accident.120 
On the other hand, driverless cars are not so straightforward as they leave a 
liability gap when the computers that control the cars are forced to make a 
decision that they are not programed to make.121 It is difficult to determine 
who is responsible for an unforeseeable event that is left to the judgment of 
a computer, as opposed to a human.122 While there is a negligence standard 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (describing how the surgeon immediately changed his 
surgery technique in response to the surgical robot’s malfunction); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (ex-
plaining how the surgeon was able to perform the surgery without the malfunctioning robot). 
 116 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (describing how the surgeon changed the type of sur-
gery he was performing in response to the surgical robot’s malfunction); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 
(explaining how the surgeon performed an open surgery immediately after the surgical robot mal-
functioned). 
 117 See Strickland, supra note 21 (explaining how surgical robots’ development might mimic 
that of autonomous vehicles by becoming more autonomous overtime). 
 118 See Car Accidents and Negligence: When You Are Liable for Another Person’s Driving, 
NOLO (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/car-accidents-negligence-when-
you-29731.html?utm_source=nolo-content&utm_medium=nolo&utm_campaign=nolo-related-
products [https://perma.cc/F339-8KDT] [hereinafter Car Accidents and Negligence] (explaining how 
fault and liability are determined in car accident situations); Allister R. Liao, Car Accidents and Po-
lice Reports, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/car-accidents-police-reports.html 
[https://perma.cc/SV2E-G83S] (discussing the importance of filing a police report during an acci-
dent to initiate an insurance claim). 
 119 Compare Jeffery K. Gurney, Note, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents 
Involving Autonomous Cars, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247, 248 (arguing that the manu-
facturers of autonomous vehicles should be the ones liable for accidents occurring in autonomous 
mode), with Car Accidents and Negligence, supra note 118 (explaining how fault is determined 
for a regular car accident). 
 120 See Car Accidents and Negligence, supra note 118 (describing how negligence and rea-
sonable care analyses can help determine the legal cause of a car accident). Negligence and rea-
sonable care are the standards often applied to car accidents. Id. 
 121 See Spangler, supra note 8 (discussing some of the ethical dilemmas that arise from driver-
less cars making their own decisions); Tsukayama supra note 7 (discussing some of the processes 
in which computers are left to independently exercise their own judgment). 
 122 See Gurney, supra note 119, at 257 (discussing some of the problems that arise with dif-
ferent kinds of driverless car passengers); Halsey, supra note 23 (proposing a potential framework 
for driverless car negligence); Noguchi, supra note 30 (explaining how driverless cars pose many 
questions for the insurance industry); Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian, su-
pra note 1 (discussing that it is difficult for driverless car systems to predict the behavior of hu-
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for the decision making of humans, no such standard currently exists for 
computers.123 
II. THE CROSSOVER: COMPARING SURGICAL ROBOTS WITH  
DRIVERLESS CARS 
Driverless cars and surgical robots are similar because they both em-
ploy, to some capacity, artificial intelligence.124 The liability structure and 
method of operation of surgical robots helps shed light on the liability im-
plications of California’s new 2018 regulation.125 This Section will compare 
surgical robots and driverless cars by analyzing the types of people who use 
each technology, how much control is retained by the users of each technol-
ogy, and how each fits into the unavoidably unsafe framework.126 
A. Who Uses the Technology? 
Driverless cars and surgical robots are similar in that those who are us-
ing the mechanism are not the ones who have created the machine, nor are 
they likely to fully understand its mechanics.127 For surgical robots, doctors 
who used to perform these surgeries “open,” or without the robots, are now 
controlling robots to perform these surgeries in a less invasive way.128 
While many young doctors are now exposed to surgical robot training dur-
                                                                                                                           
mans); see also W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 922 
(2005) (describing how foreseeability in recent times is framed as a duty or obligation). 
 123 See Halsey, supra note 23 (questioning how the potential liability structure of driverless 
cars will affect the current system). 
 124 Gurney, supra note 119, at 257 (arguing that manufacturers should maintain liability of 
driverless cars); Halsey, supra note 23 (discussing the liability concerns regarding driverless car 
accidents and the numerous potential liable parties); What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 
(explaining how robotic surgery works). 
 125 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (2018); see Gurney, supra note 119, at 257 (discussing 
manufacturers’ liability for driverless car accidents and malfunctions); Halsey, supra note 23 
(explaining potentially liable parties in driverless car situations); What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra 
note 79 (describing how robotic surgery works). 
 126 See infra notes 127–176 and accompanying text. 
 127 See da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20 (explaining how a surgical robot performs the 
instructing surgeon’s commands, which it receives through hand and foot controls); Pullen, supra 
note 37 (discussing how people can relinquish control to driverless cars, which allows people to be 
taken to different destinations with no effort on their part). 
 128 See Exploring Surgery Options: Open vs. Minimally Invasive, BEAUMONT (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.beaumont.org/health-wellness/blogs/exploring-surgery-options-open-vs-minimally-
invasive [https://perma.cc/W8ZZ-Q7TS] (comparing and contrasting traditional surgery with 
robotic surgery and outlining the various advantages and disadvantages of each). Open surgery is 
performed through a large, open cut in the skin. Id. Open surgery is the traditional approach, how-
ever, compared to newer innovations, it is now associated with “longer hospital stays[,] longer 
recovery[,] more pain[,] larger scars[, and] higher risks of complications such as bleeding and 
infection.” Id. 
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ing medical school, more practiced surgeons did not receive this education 
in school and thus were in need of further training.129 Therefore, surgeons 
are typically required to undergo specialized technical training in order to 
operate surgical robots.130 Similarly, because driverless cars are not being 
sold to the public yet, generally, the only training programs in place are for 
safety test drivers.131 Under California’s new 2018 regulation, the manufac-
turers’ employees that control the driverless cars are also required to under-
go a technical training program.132 In Arizona, however, a company called 
Waymo, formerly operating under Google’s driverless car initiative, is 
spearheading the first public testing of driverless cars.133 This is part of their 
initiative to make driverless cars more widespread across the country.134 
Waymo’s public trial, called the “early rider” program, is for residents of 
Phoenix, Arizona and has a limited number of driverless cars on the road.135 
There is no mention of any official training program for those selected to 
participate in the “early rider” program.136 This is in compliance with Ari-
zona law given that it has no requirement for training test drivers.137 
While driverless cars and surgical robots are similar in that those using 
the machinery are not initially familiar with the technology, the sophistica-
tion of those using each system are quite different.138 Surgeons who operate 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Doctor Training Required, SETON, https://www.seton.net/medical-services-and-programs/
surgical-services/robotic-surgery/about-robotic-surgery/doctor-training-required/ [https://perma.cc/
Q9U4-2EC6] (explaining the training required for doctors to operate a da Vinci Surgical System). 
 130 Id. The da Vinci Surgical System requires technical training for all surgeons that use it. Id. 
 131 See Fionnuala O’Leary, Here’s How Apple Is Training Their Self-Driving Car Engineers, 
WONDER HOW TO (Apr. 21, 2017), https://driverless.wonderhowto.com/news/heres-apple-is-
training-their-self-driving-car-engineers-0177226/ [https://perma.cc/S76U-34N2] (stating that exper-
iments are still being conducted on driverless cars). Additionally, California’s DMV regulation 
provides guidelines for training qualifications that test drivers must undergo. See CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 13, § 227.34 (explaining the process that a test driver must complete in order to be able 
to test a driverless car). 
 132 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.34 (discussing the necessary qualifications and train-
ings that a manufacturer must undergo in order to test its vehicle without a person in the car). 
 133 See Waymo FAQ, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/F2AH-7S3U] (ex-
plaining that Waymo’s driverless cars are currently being tested on public roads without any peo-
ple in them). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Early Riders, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/apply/ [https://perma.cc/U8HG-MVYG]. The 
“early riders” program is only currently offered in the Phoenix-metropolitan area and interested 
parties are told to apply to the limited spots. Id. There is no mention of a training program on 
Waymo’s website. See Waymo FAQ, supra note 133 (discussing the details of Waymo’s driverless 
car program). 
 136 See Early Riders, supra note 135 (explaining the application process for participating in 
the Waymo Early Rider program). 
 137 Zappala, supra note 65. 
 138 Compare Early Riders, supra note 135 (explaining how any person can apply to their 
program to test driverless cars), with Doctor Training Required, supra note 129 (describing the 
many years of education necessary in order for a person to become a surgeon). 
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using robots, such as the da Vinci system, have extensive medical 
knowledge beyond just the operation of the machine.139 Doctors attend four 
years of medical school, complete a residency, and have continuous educa-
tion throughout their careers.140 During some surgeries, the robot does not 
do its job properly and the surgeon is forced to complete the surgery using a 
different technique without its help.141 The surgeons’ vast knowledge of 
how to perform surgery assists in damage control when a surgical robot 
does not function properly.142 Alternatively, driverless cars are meant to be 
used by all people, just as regular cars are today.143 In order to drive a regu-
lar vehicle, a person must be above a certain age, hold a learner’s permit for 
a certain period of time, and pass both a written and driving test.144 Yet, this 
becomes more complicated when factoring in the robot, because the robot is 
essentially supposed to do the entirety of the driving on its own.145 This 
yields the question of whether a person who does not have a driver’s license 
can “operate” a driverless car by themselves.146 Depending on which direc-
tion legislation and technology goes, at some point in time, there might not 
be a requirement for passengers of driverless cars to be trained, and there-
fore a practical application of a driverless car could be to permit those with-
out driver’s licenses to use these cars.147 Looking specifically at the new 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See How Do You Become a Surgeon?, supra note 105 (describing the requirements for 
becoming a surgeon). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 Fed. App’x 925, 926 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing how 
many hospital staff members were unable to get the surgical robot to perform properly after it 
malfunctioned); Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 P.3d 517, 521 (Wash. 2017) (explaining 
that the surgical robot malfunctioned during surgery). 
 142 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 926 (discussing the surgeon’s decision to perform laparo-
scopic surgery after the robot malfunctioned); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 (explaining how the sur-
geon mitigated the damage of the surgical robot by performing open surgery after its malfunction). 
 143 See Early Riders, supra note 135 (explaining how any person can apply to Waymo’s early 
rider program to test driverless cars). 
 144 See Driving Age by State, VIRTUAL DRIVE, http://www.vdriveusa.com/resources/driving-age-
by-state.php [https://perma.cc/D7PH-3AFA] (listing how old one must be in each state in order to 
obtain a learner’s permit and describing the necessary steps to get a license); You Can Do It! How to 
Pass A DMV Driving Test on Your First Attempt, DRIVING TESTS (June 17, 2018) https://driving-
tests.org/beginner-drivers/you-can-do-it-how-to-pass-a-dmv-driving-test-on-your-first-attempt/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ABK-G26E] (providing tips for written and road driving tests). 
 145 See Jennifer Bradley, Will You Need a Driving License in the Age of Self-Driving Cars?, 
BBC NEWS (July 31, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40570592 [https://perma.cc/
FDL8-PJ5L] (hypothesizing that people will still need their drivers licenses when using driverless 
cars to be able to take over in the case of an emergency or malfunction); Pullen, supra note 37 
(discussing a potential for a person to take over a driverless vehicle). 
 146 See Bradley, supra note 145 (discussing drivers’ licenses in the age of driverless cars). 
 147 See Srikanth Saripalli, Are Self-Driving Cars the Future of Mobility for Disabled People?, 
THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 5, 2017), http://theconversation.com/are-self-driving-cars-the-future-
of-mobility-for-disabled-people-84037 [https://perma.cc/A76W-MV9C] (discussing how driver-
less cars could provide transportation for disabled people who would not otherwise be able to 
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California 2018 regulation, it seems that by allowing manufacturers to test 
drive their cars without people inside, the regulation lays the foundation for 
this type of transportation to exist.148 Legislatures will have to weigh the 
utility of transporting people who are unable to drive by themselves with 
the safety concern of the driverless car malfunctioning, forcing the passen-
ger of the car to take the wheel.149 
B. Exerting Control 
For both surgical robots and driverless cars, there is some element of 
people relinquishing control and entrusting artificial intelligence to perform 
dangerous and complicated tasks.150 Despite this, an important difference 
between surgical robots and driverless cars is the amount of control the op-
erators of each technology retain.151 The surgeons operating surgical robots 
maintain more control than the users of driverless cars.152 What makes driv-
erless cars such a novel legal issue is the fact that people retain little to no 
control of the day-to-day operations of the cars, which makes the calcula-
tion of liability complex.153 With surgical robots, there are potentially two 
main causes of error when injury occurs: (1) the doctor made an error be-
fore or during the operation of the surgical robot, or (2) the surgical robot 
malfunctioned and did not operate in the way it was supposed to.154 There-
                                                                                                                           
operate a vehicle); Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (describing how driverless car 
software works). For testing purposes, however, when there is a passenger in the front seat, they 
can take over the car in the event of an emergency. Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills 
Pedestrian, supra note 1. 
 148 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (stating that you do not need a person inside a driver-
less car in order to test it, under certain circumstances). 
 149 See Doctor Training Required, supra note 129 (discussing training of surgeons for surgical 
robots); Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian, supra note 1 (describing an acci-
dent between a pedestrian and a driverless car). 
 150 See da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20 (discussing the hand and foot controls that 
surgeons use to operate the surgical robot); Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (explain-
ing how, ideally, when people use a driverless car, they should not be required to take control of 
the vehicle); What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (analogizing a surgical robot to a video 
game, where the surgeon controls the robot remotely). 
 151 Compare Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (explaining how people should have 
to do very little to operate a driverless car), with What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (de-
scribing how a robotic system is similar to a video game, where the surgeon is required to move 
buttons to control the surgical robot). 
 152 Compare Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (explaining how people should be 
able to operate a driverless car without much effort), with da Vinci Robotic Surgery, supra note 20 
(discussing the hand and foot controls that surgeons use to operate the surgical robot). 
 153 See Halsey, supra note 23 (discussing a potential liability structure for driverless cars that 
includes the car determining the accident’s causation); Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 
(describing how people do little to control driverless vehicles). 
 154 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 925 (stating that the plaintiff brought claims against both 
the manufacturer for products liability, and against the hospital for the surgeon’s negligence dur-
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fore, whether it be the surgeon operating the robot or the engineer who de-
signed the robot, there are clear parties that the plaintiff can assign blame 
to.155 
The difficulty with driverless cars is both the lack of human control 
and the heavy reliance on computer software and programming done ahead 
of time.156 A potential problem that needs to be addressed is who is at fault 
when a driverless car faces something that its programming does not ac-
count for, including ethical dilemmas such as the trolley problem.157 It may 
be difficult to figure out a tangible party to assign blame to, depending upon 
both the legal standard and the situation at hand.158 If the standard is merely 
negligence, and the driverless car was programmed to perform the tasks that 
it would be reasonably expected to, then the programmer would likely not 
be at fault, so long as the instance was unforeseeable.159 At the same time, a 
strict liability approach could also be taken, which would make the manu-
facturer liable regardless of foreseeability.160 
An additional consideration regarding the machine operators’ control is 
the speed at which an accident occurs during the operation of a surgical robot 
versus a driverless car accident.161 As evidenced by the relevant case law, 
                                                                                                                           
ing the surgery); Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that the 
plaintiff brought charges against the hospital and surgeon for the surgeon’s negligence during a 
surgery involving a surgical robot). 
 155 Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 925 (explain that the charges the plaintiff brought against both 
the hospital and the manufacturer of the robot); Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d at 781 (describing 
the plaintiff’s charges against the hospital and surgeon). 
 156 See Pullen, supra note 37 (explaining how a GPS, a radar system, and an information 
synthetizing system are all critical to turning a regular car autonomous); Self-Driving Cars Ex-
plained, supra note 37 (discussing how sensors, software controlling navigation, and driving are 
important features of autonomous cars). 
 157 See Simson Garfinkel, Hackers Are the Real Obstacle for Self-Driving Vehicles, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608618/hackers-are-the-real-obstacle-
for-self-driving-vehicles/ [https://perma.cc/9294-DURG] (explaining how the nature of self-driving 
vehicles’ computer software could lead to cyber-attacks, forcing vehicles to perform certain acts 
without the consent of the manufacturer or passenger); Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, 
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-
ethics-of-autonomous-cars/280360/ [https://perma.cc/A7UH-4X7P] (discussing how self-driving 
cars will have to act with judgment to make decisions about how to react in an emergency situa-
tion); Spangler, supra note 12 (explaining how autonomous cars will often face ethical dilemmas 
that mimic the trolley problem); supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 158 See Halsey, supra note 23 (discussing the difficulties of assigning fault in autonomous 
vehicle crashes). 
 159 See id. (suggesting that in order to determine the fault of a driverless car, it would be im-
portant to analyze if the driverless car was reasonable in its action, meaning that either a person at 
the wheel or another autonomous vehicle would not have done differently in the situation). 
 160 See Allain, supra note 112, at 1067 (explaining states choose to pursue either a strict liabil-
ity or negligence approach for product liability cases). 
 161 See Alex Davies, The Very Human Problem Blocking the Path to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED 
(Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/human-problem-blocking-path-self-driving-cars/ 
[https://perma.cc/M2TC-ZWNU] [hereinafter Davies, The Very Human Problem] (highlighting 
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surgeons often have time to correct the mistakes of a surgical robot.162 On the 
other hand, during a car accident that only takes a few seconds to occur, there 
is very little time to correct a driverless car’s mistake.163 Another issue that 
arises is the extent to which the jury will be able to make a technical, factual 
determination of who was responsible.164 Both the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals in 2016, in Brown v. Griffin, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2011, in Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, placed a strong emphasis on the ne-
cessity of expert testimony to prove that the surgical robot caused the inju-
ry.165 While the courts discussed the complex nature of the cases, they did not 
discuss whether it was caused by their medical or artificial intelligence is-
sues.166 Unlike surgery, however, driving a car is something done by many, 
which yields the question of whether expert testimony would be necessary for 
autonomous vehicle cases because of the familiarity of most jurors with driv-
ing cars in general.167 But driverless car cases, however, are more complex 
because many jurors might not understand the technical code of the software 
                                                                                                                           
the difficulties people face in intervening quickly in an emergency accident situation that a driver-
less car might face); What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (discussing how surgeons maintain 
control the entire time they operate a surgical robot). 
 162 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (explaining how, when a surgical robot malfunctioned, 
the surgeon continued the procedure using the laparoscopic technique); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 521 
(discussing how a surgeon mitigated the damage caused by a surgical robot that malfunctioned 
and completed the surgery using the traditional, open, method); How Do You Become a Surgeon?, 
supra note 105 (explaining the necessary education required to become a surgeon); see also What 
Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (explaining how surgeons need to control surgical robots the 
entire time they are using one during a surgical procedure). 
 163 See Davies, The Very Human Problem, supra note 161 (describing how people are essen-
tially “useless” in emergency situations regarding semi-autonomous vehicles because of distracti-
bility and slow response time). 
 164 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (explaining the use of expert testimony in surgical 
robot cases); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 782–83 (describing the necessity of expert testimony to estab-
lish the standard of care for surgical robot cases); Halsey, supra note 23 (describing a potential 
framework for the liability of driverless cars). 
 165 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (describing the importance of expert testimony in 
cases regarding robots); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 782–83 (establishing that expert testimony is nec-
essary for establishing the standard of care necessary for cases regarding surgical robots). 
 166 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 927 (explaining the potential for juror confusion in com-
plex litigation, such as surgical robots); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 782–83 (emphasizing the im-
portance of expert testimony in surgical robot cases). 
 167 See Expert Witnesses on Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Cases, HG LEGAL RES., https://
www.hg.org/article.asp?id=46691 [https://perma.cc/22YT-J35Q] [hereinafter Expert Witnesses on 
Liability] (predicting a rise in expert testimony in jury trials for autonomous vehicle cases because 
of the complexity of the technology); Jerry Hirsch, 253 Million Cars and Trucks on U.S. Roads; 
Average Age Is 11.4 Years, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-
fi-hy-ihs-automotive-average-age-car-20140609-story.html [https://perma.cc/H3TD-7DHW] (cit-
ing that in 2014, there were 253 million cars on the road in the United States). 
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embedded in these cars and how this software actually commands the car to 
perform different tasks.168 
C. Safety and Warnings 
Unavoidably unsafe products have strict rules about warning those 
who will use the product about its dangers.169 A product that is “unavoida-
bly unsafe” is one that is unable to be made safe for its “intended and ordi-
nary use.”170 Surgical robots are classified as unavoidably unsafe and thus 
carry with them a duty to warn.171 Driverless cars would likely have the 
same classification.172 A driverless car, by virtue of being a car, puts its us-
ers in a somewhat harmful position, as cars can travel fast and have the po-
tential of getting into an accident.173 Therefore, it will be important for the 
manufacturers of driverless cars to provide ample warnings to all parties 
that will potentially be aboard a driverless car.174 But it is unclear whether 
driverless cars require more warnings than standard cars.175 If other states 
follow California’s approach and implement a regulatory framework for 
driverless cars, it could mean that when driverless cars become available to 
the public, user warnings will be required by law because of their potential 
classification as unavoidably unsafe.176 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Expert Witnesses on Liability, supra note 167 (describing how expert witnesses are 
important in cases regarding autonomous vehicles because of the judge and jury’s potential confu-
sion). 
 169 See Taylor, 389 P.3d at 528 (discussing the necessity of warnings for products deemed 
unavoidably unsafe). 
 170 Id. at 526. 
 171 See id. at 528 (classifying surgical robots as unavoidably unsafe). If a product is deemed 
unavoidably unsafe, then it is not held to the strict liability standard that most other products lia-
bility cases use, so long as there was adequate warning from the manufacturer of the product to the 
buyer. Id. 
 172 See id. (defining unavoidably unsafe products); see also Olivia Solon, Who’s Driving? Au-
tonomous Cars May Be Entering the Most Dangerous Phase, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/24/self-driving-cars-dangerous-period-false-
security [https://perma.cc/4WBY-9GGY] (discussing some of the dangers of autonomous vehi-
cles). 
 173 See Solon, supra note 172 (expressing some safety concerns regarding driverless cars). 
 174 See Taylor, 389 P.3d at 528 (discussing that case law dictates that products deemed una-
voidably unsafe must have adequate warnings); Solon, supra note 172 (noting how autonomous 
vehicles are risky and have notable dangers). 
 175 See Taylor, 389 P.3d at 528 (describing necessary warnings for unavoidably safe prod-
ucts); Solon, supra note 172 (detailing the dangers of autonomous vehicles). 
 176 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (outlining the requirements for testing driverless cars 
in the State of California); Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (explaining California’s new allowance of 
completely autonomous cars to be tested); Mark Geistfeld, Why the Next Person Hit by a Driver-
less Car Might Not Be Able to Sue, TIME (Mar. 30, 2018), http://time.com/5221393/uber-
autonomous-vehicle-death-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/4EJR-RMUY] (discussing the potential 
for users of driverless vehicles to waive their torts rights, just as many do for vaccines and other 
risky ventures). 
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III. HITTING THE ROAD: HOW STATES SHOULD HANDLE REGULATION  
AND LIABILITY OF DRIVERLESS CARS 
The example of surgical robots can assist in analyzing the future liabil-
ity structure for driverless cars.177 There are, however, distinct differences in 
the way that these two machines operate that are important to consider from 
a legal perspective.178 California’s change in regulation in 2018 that allows 
manufacturers to test driverless cars without a person in the car is a positive 
step towards creating efficiency, and the decision’s benefits outweigh its 
detriments.179 Despite the many similarities between surgical robots and 
driverless cars, they differ in their requirement for a human operator, mak-
ing it more important that those creating and testing driverless cars are regu-
lated to insure their products are safe and work properly.180 Additionally, 
California’s new 2018 regulation is different than other deregulated states’ 
regulations as it creates requirements manufacturers must meet in order to 
test their driverless cars without people inside them.181 It lays out extensive 
guidelines and steps that manufacturers need to take in order to be approved 
to test their driverless vehicles without people, which will help ensure safe-
ty and be helpful in establishing a liability framework.182 This Section will 
argue that all states should adopt detailed regulations pertaining to driver-
less cars because it provides clear guidelines for manufacturers to follow 
                                                                                                                           
 177 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227 (2018). See generally Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 
Fed. App’x 925, 925–27 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff must produce clear evidence of 
injury to avoid summary judgment); Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 777–83 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2016) (holding that expert testimony is necessary for juries to understand surgical robot cases); 
Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 P.3d 517, 517–30 (Wash. 2017) (holding that manufacturers 
have a duty to warn about their unavoidably unsafe products). 
 178 Compare Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (explaining the mechanics behind 
self-driving cars), with What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (describing how a surgical robots 
are used to perform surgery). 
 179 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227. Compare Thompson, supra note 11 (discussing the 
many benefits of driverless cars, such as improved fuel efficiency and traffic), with Solon, supra 
note 172 (explaining how driverless cars will likely go through a period of growing pains when 
they are first implemented). 
 180 See Mracek, 363 Fed. App’x at 925–27 (holding that plaintiff must produce clear evidence 
of injury to avoid summary judgment); Brown, 505 S.W.3d at 777–83 (holding that expert testi-
mony is necessary for juries to understand surgical robot cases); Taylor, 389 P.3d at 517–30 (hold-
ing that manufacturers have a duty to warn about their unavoidably unsafe products). Compare 
Self-Driving Cars Explained, supra note 37 (explaining the mechanics behind self-driving cars), 
with What Is Robotic Surgery?, supra note 79 (describing how surgical robots are used to perform 
surgery). 
 181 See Bhuiyan, supra note 15 (explaining California’s new 2018 regulation allowing com-
pletely autonomous vehicles to be tested on roads); Zappala, supra note 64 (discussing Arizona’s 
limited regulations regarding driverless cars and how they attract companies who wish to test 
driverless cars there). 
 182 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.38 (providing guidelines for manufacturers to test their 
vehicles on public roads, holding them accountable for these tests). 
342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:317 
leading to greater road safety and shifting liability to manufacturers.183 It 
will additionally argue that allowing driverless cars on the road without 
people will help alleviate traffic, create more efficiency, and positively im-
pact the environment.184 
A. The Importance of Providing Clear, Detailed Regulations 
California’s new 2018 regulation is positive in that it provides a solid 
structural framework for the future regulation of driverless cars in the pub-
lic market.185 This framework puts a large burden on the manufacturers to 
ensure that their vehicles are safe, their operators are well-trained, and the 
general public is protected from vehicle testing.186 For example, the Cali-
fornia 2018 regulation mandates that the remote operators of the driverless 
cars are trained extensively and technically before the manufacturer’s vehi-
cles can see the road.187 The California 2018 regulation’s guidelines could 
lay foundation for future training programs for riders of driverless cars and 
therefore, similar regulations should be adopted by other states.188 When 
considering the recent autonomous vehicle accident that occurred in Tempe, 
Arizona that killed a pedestrian, it is important to note that Arizona has very 
limited regulation of driverless car testing.189 The idea of a training program 
is supported by the surgical robot framework, as surgeons who operate surgi-
cal robots are required to go through additional trainings in order to use these 
machines.190 While implementing a training program for all future riders of 
driverless cars certainly has its limitations in practice, holding the manufac-
turers, at a minimum, to these standards will increase safety and help hold 
manufacturers legally accountable for their mistakes.191 Perhaps if there was a 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra notes 207–223 and accompanying text. 
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mandatory training program in place in Tempe, the driver would have been 
better prepared to change the course of the vehicle or would have been 
more attentive at the wheel.192 Despite this, it is important to note that the 
accident was deemed to be at the fault of the vehicle, not the driver and that 
driverless cars are still in the testing phase.193 
Other states should adopt detailed regulations for driverless car testing 
and use California’s new 2018 regulation as an example.194 By holding 
manufacturers to high standards, the California 2018 regulation puts the 
burden on the manufacturers to account for any concerns that may arise, as 
they are in the best position to internalize these costs.195 The manufacturers 
of driverless cars are sophisticated individuals who were able to create 
complex machines, whereas the future users of driverless cars are average 
people with no specialized knowledge.196 Additionally, when driverless cars 
are likely classified as unavoidably unsafe, regulation can encourage and 
help manufacturers adequately warn future driverless car patrons.197 If a 
person purchases a driverless car for their own use and properly maintains 
it, it would be unfair to fault them for any accidents when the vehicle is 
supposed to independently drive itself.198 Instead, California’s approach 
puts the responsibility on the manufacturer, forcing them to adjust their pro-
tocol to fit within the preexisting institutions.199 For example, California’s 
2018 regulation puts the responsibility on the manufacturer to make driver-
less cars accessible for first responders in case of an emergency, which will 
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help create a smoother, safer transition when driverless cars are eventually 
sold to the public.200 
The approach of putting the majority of liability on the manufacturers 
of the vehicle is somewhat different from surgical robot litigation, which 
typically will spread liability across numerous parties.201 The fact that sur-
gical robots are operated by highly sophisticated surgeons, whereas driver-
less cars are intended to be used by ordinary people, creates an important 
legal distinction.202 The parties often include the manufacturer of the robot, 
the hospital, and the operating surgeon.203 In addition to surgeons’ sophisti-
cation and specialized knowledge, their retained control regarding the robot 
makes it difficult to tell who was at fault in a situation, and therefore plain-
tiffs often list both as parties when they sue.204 This differs from a situation 
where two driverless cars get into an accident where there are no people 
operating either vehicle.205 The liability would most likely fall to the manu-
facturer whose car was at fault as it should, unless one of the owners of the 
driverless car failed to maintain their vehicle properly or otherwise proxi-
mately caused the accident.206 
B. Allowing Cars to Drive Themselves 
By allowing manufacturers to test driverless cars without people in-
side, California is setting the stage for driverless cars to operate autono-
mously when they become available to the public.207 There are many bene-
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fits to taking this approach, including creating more efficiency.208 For ex-
ample, a driverless car can drop off one person at location A and then drive 
itself somewhere else to pick up a different person from location B.209 This 
could decrease the number of cars on the road, which would be beneficial to 
reduce traffic and environmental degradation.210 Driverless cars could also 
become a method of transportation for those otherwise unable to drive.211 
This has the potential to greatly improve the quality of life for people who 
could not drive a car prior to this innovation.212 
Despite this potential, allowing cars to drive themselves does leave 
open the question of the ability level someone must have in order to ride in 
a driverless car.213 For example, problems could arise due to driverless cars’ 
inability to orient an exiting passenger, such as a child dropped off at the 
wrong location, or a blind person unable to see their surroundings.214 New 
regulations can address these issues and others that may arise as driverless 
cars become available to the public.215 
During surgical robot procedures, many lives have been saved by sur-
geons who were able to operate normally when a surgical robot malfunc-
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tioned.216 The surgeons were able to react quickly and mitigate the damages 
caused by the robot.217 Very differently, California’s new 2018 regulation 
does not require that any person be inside a driverless car, therefore elimi-
nating the possibility for an expert to take over from inside the vehicle dur-
ing a malfunction.218 But, unlike surgery, in many instances it would be im-
possible for a human to intervene to prevent an accident that happens in 
mere seconds.219 In other circumstances, however, where no accident oc-
curred, it could be possible for a person to step in and drive the vehicle if 
the driverless function of the car stopped working.220 This is an additional 
concern regarding the passengers’ requisite ability level.221 While these are 
important concerns, they can be addressed through regulation and special 
programs when driverless cars are offered to the public.222 Overall, allowing 
driverless cars to operate without a person in the car has more benefits than 
it does detriments, so long as there are clear guidelines for when this is ap-
propriate, as this will promote safety and clarity for those testing driverless 
cars.223 
CONCLUSION 
 Advancements in artificial intelligence have been plentiful in the past 
few decades. Robots and other forms of artificial intelligence have been 
created in order to help people improve their livelihood and safety. Driver-
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less cars in particular are designed to elevate people from driving long dis-
tances, reduce the number of accidents on the road, and prevent dangerous 
drunk driving. Driverless cars are slowly being tested and perfected, and 
will soon be in the market for the lay person to purchase. California instated 
a new regulation in 2018 that now allows manufacturers to test their driver-
less cars without any passengers in the car, so long as they follow a series of 
rules. The impact of this rule, and other questions regarding the future lia-
bility framework of driverless cars, can be answered by looking at how the 
law handles the liability of surgical robots. 
Driverless cars and surgical robots are similar because they both utilize 
artificial intelligence in an industry that previously relied strictly on human 
intelligence. Surgical robots, however, are still much more reliant on people 
than driverless cars. Surgeons can quickly mitigate the damage caused by a 
surgical robot malfunction by going in and conducting surgery in a more 
traditional manner. People, however, might not always be able to prevent an 
accident by manually operating a driverless car. Additionally, the sophistica-
tion of surgeons and their retained control over the surgical robots make 
them more likely to become a party in a liability suit, as opposed to a lay 
person who owns a driverless car. California’s statute sets the stage for 
manufacturers to internalize the costs of creating the safest vehicles, and 
therefore forces them to face the burden in the case of a lawsuit. Califor-
nia’s approach to regulating driverless cars differs from other states such as 
Arizona. In the wake of the accident in Tempe Arizona, it will be interesting 
to see if Arizona joins California in providing pro-consumer safety regula-
tions for their driverless car testing program. 
If other states follow California in their regulation of driverless cars, it 
could possibly slow down the creation of driverless cars, as it is potentially 
putting more liability and pressure on manufacturers. Driverless cars, how-
ever, appear to be the way of the future. They can create efficiency, change 
people’s quality of life, and foster positive impacts on the environment. 
Driverless cars will soon be available to the public, and only time will tell if 
other states will follow California’s steps towards regulation and how future 
liability will be structured. 
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